哲学史-philosophy of history(英文版)-第5部分

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definite　application；　or　displayed　in　its　bearing　on　the　grand　total　—　the　entire　course　of　human
history。　But　to　explain　History　is　to　depict　the　passions　of　mankind；　the　genius；　the　active　powers；
that　play　their　part　on　the　great　stage；　and　the　providentially　determined　process　which　these
exhibit；　constitutes　what　is　generally　called　the　“plan”　of　Providence。　Yet　it　is　this　very　plan　which
is　supposed　to　be　concealed　from　our　view：　which　it　is　deemed　presumption；　even　to　wish　to
recognise。　The　ignorance　of　Anaxagoras；　as　to　how　intelligence　reveals　itself　in　actual　existence；
was　ingenuous。　Neither　in　his　consciousness；　nor　in　that　of　Greece　at　large；　had　that　thought　been
further　expanded。　He　had　not　attained　the　power　to　apply　his　general　principle　to　the　concrete；　so
as　to　deduce　the　latter　from　the　former。　It　was　Socrates　who　took　the　first　step　in　prehending
the　union　of　the　Concrete　with　the　Universal。　Anaxagoras；　then；　did　not　take　up　a　hostile　position
towards　such　an　application。　The　mon　belief　in　Providence　does；　at　least　it　opposes　the　use　of
the　principle　on　the　large　scale；　and　denies　the　possibility　of　discerning　the　plan　of　Providence。　In
isolated　cases　this　plan　is　supposed　to　be　manifest。　Pious　persons　are　encouraged　to　recognise　in
particular　circumstances；　something　more　than　mere　chance；　to　acknowledge　the　guiding　hand　of
God；　e。g。　when　help　has　unexpectedly　e　to　an　individual　in　great　perplexity　and　need。　But
these　instances。　of　providential　design　are　of　a　limited　kind；　and　concern　the　acplishment　of
nothing　more　than　the　desires　of　the　individual　in　question。　But　in　the　history　of　the　World；　the
Individuals　we　have　to　do　with　are　Peoples；　Totalities　that　are　States。　We　cannot；　therefore；　be
satisfied　with　what　we　may　call　this　“peddling”　view　of　Providence；　to　which　the　belief　alluded　to
limits　itself。　Equally　unsatisfactory　is　the　merely　abstract；　undefined　belief　in　a　Providence；　when
that　belief　is　not　brought　to　bear　upon　the　details　of　the　process　which　it　conducts。　On　the　contrary
our　earnest　endeavour　must　be　directed　to　the　recognition　of　the　ways　of　Providence；　the　means　it
uses；　and　the　historical　phenomena　in　which　it　manifests　itself；　and　we　must　show　their　connection
with　the　general　principle　above　mentioned。　But　in　noticing　the　recognition　of　the　plan　of　Divine
Providence　generally；　I　have　implicitly　touched　upon　a　prominent　question　of　the　day；　viz。　that　of
the　possibility　of　knowing　God：　or　rather　—　since　public　opinion　has　ceased　to　allow　it　to　be　a
matter　of　question　—　the　doctrine　that　it　is　impossible　to　know　God。　In　direct　contravention　of
what　is　manded　in　holy　Scripture　as　the　highest　duty；　　—　that　we　should　not　merely　love；　but
know　God；　—　the　prevalent　dogma　involves　the　denial　of　what　is　there　said；　viz。　that　it　is　the　Spirit
（der　Geist）　that　leads　into　Truth；　knows　all　things；　perates　even　into　the　deep　things　of　the
Godhead。　While　the　Divine　Being　is　thus　placed　beyond　our　knowledge；　and　outside　the　limit　of　all
human　things；　we　have　the　convenient　licence　of　wandering　as　far　as　we　list；　in　the　direction　of　our
own　fancies。　We　are　freed　from　the　obligation　to　refer　our　knowledge　to　the　Divine　and　True。　On
the　other　hand；　the　vanity　and　egotism　which　characterise　it　find；　in　this　false　position；　ample
justification　and　the　pious　modesty　which　puts　far　from　it　the　knowledge　of　God；　can　well　estimate
how　much　furtherance　thereby　accrues　to　its　own　wayward　and　vain　strivings。　I　have　been
unwilling　to　leave　out　of　sight　the　connection　between　our　thesis　…　that　Reason　governs　and　has
governed　the　World　—　and　the　question　of　the　possibility　of　a　Knowledge　of　God；　chiefly　that　I
might　not　lose　the　opportunity　of　mentioning　the　imputation　against　Philosophy　of　being　shy　of
noticing　religious　truths；　or　of　having　occasion　to　be　so　in　which　is　insinuated　the　suspicion　that　it
has　anything　but　a　clear　conscience　in　the　presence　of　these　truths。　So　far　from　this　being　the　case；
the　fact　is；　that　in　recent　times　Philosophy　has　been　obliged　to　defend　the　domain　of　religion
against　the　attacks　of　several　theological　systems。　In　the　Christian　religion　God　has　revealed
Himself；　—　that　is；　he　has　given　us　to　understand　what　He　is；　so　that　He　is　no　longer　a　concealed
or　secret　existence。　And　this　possibility　of　knowing　Him；　thus　afforded　us；　renders　such
knowledge　a　duty。　God　wishes　no　narrow…hearted　souls　or　empty　heads　for　his　children；　but　those
whose　spirit　is　of　itself　indeed；　poor；　but　rich　in　the　knowledge　of　Him；　and　who　regard　this
knowledge　of　God　as　the　only　valuable　possession。　That　development　of　the　thinking　spirit；　which
has　resulted　from　the　revelation　of　the　Divine　Being　as　its　original　basis；　must　ultimately　advance　to
the　intellectual　prehension　of　what　was　presented　in　the　first　instance；　to　feeling　and
imagination。　The　time　must　eventually　e　for　understanding　that　rich　product　of　active　Reason；
which　the　History　of　the　World　offers　to　us。　It　was　for　a　while　the　fashion　to　profess　admiration　for
the　wisdom　of　God；　as　displayed　in　animals；　plants；　and　isolated　occurrences。　But；　if　it　be　allowed
that　Providence　manifests　itself　in　such　objects　and　forms　of　existence；　why　not　also　in　Universal
History？　This　is　deemed　too　great　a　matter　to　be　thus　regarded。　But　Divine　Wisdom；　i。e。　Reason。；
is　one　and　the　same　in　the　great　as　in　the　little；　and　we　must　not　imagine　God　to　be　too　weak　to
exercise　his　wisdom　on　the　grand　scale。　Our　intellectual　striving　aims　at　realising　the　conviction　that
what　was　intended　by　eternal　wisdom；　is　actually　acplished　in　the　domain　of　existent；　active
Spirit；　as　well　as　in　that　of　mere　Nature。　Our　mode　of　treating　the　subject　is；　in　this　aspect；　a
Theodicaea；　—　a　justification　of　the　ways　of　God；　—　which　Leibnitz　attempted　metaphysically　in
his　method；　i。e。　in　indefinite　abstract　categories；　—　so　that　the　ill　that　is　found　in　the　World　may　be
prehended；　and　the　thinking　Spirit　reconciled　with　the　fact　of　the　existence　of　evil。　Indeed；
nowhere　is　such　a　harmonising　view　more　pressingly　demanded　than　in　Universal　History；　and　it
can　be　attained　only　by　recognising　the　positive　existence；　in　which　that　negative　element　is　a
subordinate；　and　vanquished　nullity。　On　the　one　hand。　the　ultimate　design　of　the　World　must　be
perceived；　and；　on　the　other　hand；　the　fact　that　this　design　has　been　actually；　realised　in　it；　and　that
evil　has　not　been　able　permanently　to　assert　a　peting　position。　But　this　conviction　involves
much　more　than　the　mere　belief　in　a　superintending　or　in　“Providence。”　“Reason；”　whose
sovereignty　over　the　World　has　been　maintained；　is　as　indefinite　a　term　as　“Providence；”
supposing　the　term　to　be　used　by　those　who　are　unable　to　characterise　it　distinctly；　—　to　show
wherein　it　consists；　so　as　to　enable　us　to　decide　whether　a　thing　is　rational　or　irrational。　An
adequate　definition　of　Reason　is　the　first　desideratum；　and　whatever　boast　may　be　made　of　strict
adherence　to　it　in　explaining　phenomena；　—　without　such　a　definition　we　get　no　farther　than　mere
words。　With　these　observations　we　may　proceed　to　the　second　point　of　view　that　has　to　be
considered　in　this　Introduction。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　II。　Essential　destiny　of　Reason

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　18

The　enquiry　into　the　essential　destiny　of　Reason　—　as　far　as　it　is　considered　in　reference　to　the
World　—　is　identical　with　the　question；　what　is　the　ultimate　design　of　the　World？　And　the
expression　implies　that　that　design　is　destined　to　be　realised。　Two　points　of　consideration　suggest
themselves：　first；　the　import　of　this　design　—　its　abstract　definition；　and　secondly；　its　realisation。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　19

It　must　be　observed　at　the　outset；　that　the　phenomenon　we　investigate　—　Universal　History　—
belongs　to　the　realm　of　Spirit。　The　term　“World；”　includes　both　physical　and　psychical　Nature。
Physical　Nature　also　plays　its　part　in　the　World's　History；　—　and　attention　will　have　to　be　paid　to
the　fundamental　natural　relations　thus　involved。　But　Spirit；　and　the　course　of　its　development；　is　our
substantial　object。　Our　task　does　not　require　us　to　contemplate　Nature　as　a　Rational　System　in
itself　—　though　in　its　own　proper　domain　it　proves　itself　such　—　but　simply　in　its　relation　to　Spirit。
On　the　stage　on　which　we　are　observing　it；　—　Universal　History　—　Spirit　displays　itself　in　its　most
concrete　reality。　Notwithstanding　this　（or　rather　for　the　very　purpose　of　prehending　the
general　principles　which　this；　its　form　of　concrete　reality；　embodies）　we　must　premise　some
abstract　characteristics　of　the　nature　of　spirit。　Such　an　explanation；　however；　cannot　be　given
here　under　any　other　form　than　that　of　bare　assertion。　The　present　is　not　the　occasion　for　unfolding
the　idea　of　Spirit　speculatively；　for　whatever　has　a　place　in　an　Introduction；　must；　as　already
observed；　be　taken　as　simply　historical；　something　assumed　as　having　been　explained　and　proved
elsewhere；　or　whose　demonstration　awaits　the　sequel　of　the　Science　of　History　itself。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　20

We　have　therefore　to　mention　here：　

（1）　The　abstract　characteristics　of　the　nature　of　Spirit。　

（2）　What　means　Spirit　uses　in　order　to　realise　its　Idea。　

（3）　Lastly；　we　must　consider　the　shape　which　the　perfect　embodiment　of　Spirit　assumes…the　State。　

　　　　（1）　The　Abstract　Characteristics　of　the　Nature　of　Spirit

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　21

The　nature　of　Spirit　may　be　understood　by　a　glance　at　its　direct　opposite　—　Matter。　As　the
essence　of　Matter　is　Gravity；　so；　on　the　other　hand；　we　may　affirm　that　the　substance；　the　essence
of　Spirit　is　Freedom。　All　will　readily　assent　to　the　doctrine　that　Spirit；　among　other　properties；　is
also　endowed　with　Freedom；　but　philosophy　teaches　that　all　the　qualities　of　Spirit　exist　only
through　Freedom；　that　all　are　but　means　for　attaining　Freedom；　that　all　seek　and　produce　this　and
this　alone。　It　is　a　result　of　speculative　Philosophy；　that　Freedom　is　the　sole　truth　of　Spirit。　Matter
possesses　gravity　in　virtue　of　its　tendency　towards　a　central　point。　It　is　essentially　posite；
consisting　of　parts　that　exclude　each　other。　It　seeks　its　Unity；　and　therefore　exhibits　itself　as
self…destructive；　as　verging　towards　its　opposite　＇an　indivisible　point＇。　If　it　could　attain　this；　it　would
be　Matter　no　longer；　it　would　have　perished。　It　strives　after　the　realisation　of　its　Idea；　for　in　Unity　it
exists　ideally。　Spirit；　on　the　contrary；　may　be　defined　as　that　which　has　its　centre　in　itself。　It　has
not　a　unity　outside　itself；　but　has　already　found　it；　it　exists　in　and　with　itself。　Matter　has　its　essence
out　of　itself；　Spirit　is　self…contained　existence　（Bei…sich…selbst…seyn）。　Now　this　is　Freedom；
exactly。　For　if　I　am　dependent；　my　being　is　referred　to　something　else　which　I　am　not；　I　cannot
exist　independently　of　something　external。　I　am　free　on　the　contrary；　when　my　existence　depends
upon　myself。　This　self…contained　existence　of　Spirit　is　none　other　than　self…consciousness　—
consciousness　of　one's　own　being。　Two　things　must　be　distinguished　in　consciousness；　first；　the
fact　that　I　know；　secondly；　what　I　know。　In　sel